Kansas by Trainer, Sarah
Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal
Volume 5 | Number 2




Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej
Part of the Energy and Utilities Law Commons, Natural Resources Law Commons, and the Oil,
Gas, and Mineral Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal by an authorized editor of University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. For more
information, please contact darinfox@ou.edu.
Recommended Citation






Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal 





Table of Contents 
I. Introduction ........................................................................................... 134 
II. Legislative and Regulatory Developments ........................................... 134 
III. Judicial Developments ........................................................................ 134 
                                                                                                                 
 * Sarah Trainer is an associate in The Woodlands, Texas office of Steptoe & Johnson 
PLLC, who concentrates her practice in the areas of energy law and mineral law, and is 
licensed to practice in Kansas, Texas, Nebraska and Oklahoma. Steven A. Rhodes is Of 
Counsel in the Charleston, West Virginia office of Steptoe & Johnson PLLC, and concentrates 
his practice in the areas of energy law and mineral law, with a focus on coal, oil, and gas 
transactions, and related industry contracts, and is licensed to practice in West Virginia. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019




The following is an update on Kansas legislative activity and case law 
relating to oil and gas law from August 1, 2018 to July 31, 2019.   
II. Legislative and Regulatory Developments 
There has not been any significant Legislative or Regulatory 
Developments affecting Kansas Oil and Gas Law from August 1, 2018, to 
July 31, 2019.  It is worth noting that Kansas House Bill No. 2240 has been 
introduced to the Legislature in 2019.1  If enacted, the Bill would require the 
state corporation commission to ensure that a seismic risk analysis is 
conducted upon class II disposal wells.2    
III. Judicial Developments 
A. Supreme Court Cases 
1. Oxy USA Inc. v. Red Wing Oil, LLC3 
This case arises from a dispute over a one-half ownership interest in the 
minerals under a quarter section of land in Haskell County.  The Supreme 
Court of Kansas held that the purported holders could not establish adverse 
possession based on receipt of royalties for 15 years.4 
 a) Facts and Procedural History 
Oxy USA Inc. (“Oxy”) developed a productive oil and gas well on a 
unitized production unit of land.”5  Though the well is not on the land, “the 
owner of the minerals under the Property is entitled to receive royalties from 
the production by virtue of the unitization agreement.”6  When Oxy was 
unable to determine “who owned a disputed one-half mineral interest in and 
under the Property,” the company initiated an action to quiet title.7   
The landowners entered into an oil and gas lease, and following their 
death, Frank Luther took control of the property and lease. Luther sold the 
property, “reserving an ‘undivided one-half interest in the oil, gas or other 
minerals in and under and that may be produced from the …property…for a 
                                                                                                                 
 1. H.B. 2240, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2019). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Oxy USA Inc. v. Red Wing Oil, 442 P.3d 504 (Kan. 2019).    
 4. Id. at 505. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id.   
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period of twenty (20) years or as long thereafter as oil, gas or other minerals 
is produced therefrom.’”8  
When the mineral interest expired, “the one-half mineral interest reverted 
to the fee holder at that time,”  Alice King’s father, who owned the property 
at the time.9 Between the time the term interest expired in 1972 and when 
Oxy completed the well in 2009, the term mineral interest holders were 
receiving royalties from their alleged one-half mineral interest.10 However, 
because interest had already expired and the right to receive royalties reverted 
to King’s father, “the term mineral interest holders should not have been 
receiving the royalties.”11 Not until Oxy filed this action did King attempt to 
enforce her reversionary rights..12   
The Kanas Supreme Court distilled the case down to one question: “Can 
King enforce her reversionary interest in the minerals against the term 
mineral interest holders or is she now prevented from doing so by a statute 
of limitations or adverse possession?”13       
b) Analysis 
The Supreme Court exercised unlimited review to interpret Sections 60-
503 and 60-507 of the Kansas Code. The court determined that “the term 
mineral interest holders did not claim that the cause of action accrued more 
than 15 years prior,” and therefore, there was no concert whether the action 
was time-barred.14 Rather, the focus of the case is whether the term mineral 
interest holders satisfy a claim of adverse possession under Section 60-503.15  
While a mineral interest is susceptible to adverse possession, the “mere 
misappropriation of royalties” is insufficient on its own to establish such a 
claim.16  Relying on Stratmann v. Stratmann,17 the court determined that 
royalty payment “represents a portion of the value of minerals after 
production and therefore; being in open, exclusive, and continuous 
possession of a royalty can never suffice to establish an adverse claim over 
minerals in place.”18  
                                                                                                                 
 8. Id. at 506 (internal citation omitted).   
 9. Id.  
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 507. 
 15. Id.   
 16. Id. at 508.   
 17. 628 P.2d 1080, 1085 (1981) 
 18. Oxy USA Inc., 442 P.3d at 508 (emphasis original).   
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Ultimately, the court concluded that adversely possession of minerals in 
place requires more than merely “receiving royalties after the minerals have 
been extracted.”19  An adverse possessor must work the minerals actively.20  
Passively receiving royalties, despite being open, exclusive, and continuous 
for a period of 15 years, does not constitute adverse possession.21  
2. Jason Oil Co. v. Littler22 
The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the mineral interest conveyed when 
grantor attempted to except the mineral interests for a “period of 20 years or 
as long thereafter” as minerals continued to be produced.23  The Supreme 
Court determined that the common-law rule against perpetuities, was not 
applicable. This was a case of first impression for the Kansas Supreme 
Court.24 
a) Facts and Procedural History 
Prior to his death,  Frank E. Littler (Grantor) executed two deeds 
conveying two tracts of land situated in Rush County, Kansas to relatives.25  
Both deeds conveyed the following language: 
“EXCEPT AND SUBJECT TO:  Grantor saves and excepts all 
oil, gas and other minerals in and under or that may be produced 
from said land for a period of 20 years or as long thereafter as oil 
and/or gas and/or other minerals may be produced therefrom and 
thereunder.”  (the reservation)26 
While no drilling operations occurred from the original conveyance 
through 2017, Jason Oil Company (“Jason Oil”) entered into a leasing 
agreement with successors in interest of Grantor’s mineral estate and sought 
to quiet title with respect to Grantor’s multiple conveyances (through deed 
and then later inheritance).27  
                                                                                                                 
 19. Id. (emphasis added). 
 20. See 1 Kuntz, Law of Oil and Gas 10.5 (1987).   
 21. Oxy USA Inc., 442 P.3d at 508. 
 22. Jason Oil Company, LLC v. Littler, 446 P.3d 1058 (Kan. 2019).    
 23. Id. at 1059. 
 24. Id. at 1061. 
 25. Id. at 1060. 
 26. Id.   
 27. Id. 
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Jason Oil’s petition alleged that the successors to the Grantees in both 
deeds owned all of the minerals in and under each tract.  The heirs of the 
Grantor answered, claiming a valid interest in the mineral rights, arguing that 
after the deeds were properly executed and delivered, Grantor was vested 
with a  fee simple determinable in the mineral rights and the Grantees to the 
deeds held springing executory interests which were subject to and 
invalidated by the Rule Against Perpetuities (the Rule).28    
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Jason Oil.  The 
trial court noted that “[t]here is no dispute that Frank E. Littler [Grantor] 
conveyed all of his interest in the subject properties to the respective grantees, 
subject only to the grantor’s express reservation, excepting and saving a term 
mineral interest.”29  The trial court noted that the intent of the grantor is a 
legally binding principle, and that Grantor’s intentions “could not be clearer 
than stated.”30 The lower court also found that Grantor’s reservation had not 
restricted alienation of the surface and mineral estates, and the Grantor’s 
heirs thereafter timely appealed to the Kansas Supreme Court.31   
b) Analysis 
The Supreme Court addressed the question of first impression regarding 
the nature of a common practice of reserving a term mineral interest as a 
potential springing executory interest, and noted the potentially large or 
catastrophic effect (if the conveyance did indeed create the executory 
interest) on the evaluation of title conveyances.32  
The Court exercised a standard of unlimited review, based on the review 
of summary judgment and the question of legal interpretation.33  The Rule 
“precludes the creation of any future interest in property which does not 
necessarily vest within twenty-one (21) years after a life or lives presently in 
being, plus the period of gestation, where gestation is, in fact, taking place.”34  
The Rule in Kansas “began as a creation of common law.”35  The Kansas 
Legislature statutorily adopted, and also modified, the Rule in 1992.36  This 
                                                                                                                 
 28. Id.   
 29. Id. at 1061. 
 30. Id 
 31. Id. at 1061.   
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 1062 (quoting Rucker v. DeLay, 289 P.3d 1166, 1170 (Kan. 2012) (internal 
citation omitted)).   
 35. Id. (quoting Rucker, 289 P.3d  at 1170).   
 36. Id. 
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statutory modification applied only to non-vested property interests created 
on or after the statute and so did not apply to the 1967 deeds at issue.37  
Therefore, the Court had to determine whether the common-law Rule applied 
to Grantor’s conveyance.38   
The Court stated that the district court was correct in concluding that the 
Grantor’s mineral interest was a “defeasible term mineral interest” under 
Kansas law.39  However, the district court had determined that the mineral 
interest was a future, rather than present, interest, which was an incorrect 
interpretation. The result, that Grantor’s heirs maintained an interest in the 
mineral estate, was therefore correct but not because the Rule applied to a 
future interest but because the conveyance granted a present, vested 
interest.40  
The Court noted: 
The future interest created by the deeds that the district court 
should have focused on is the interest in the minerals that passed 
to the Grantees.  That interest is the right for the Grantees to have 
full possession and use of the mineral interest following the 
expiration or termination of the Grantor’s reserved defeasible 
term interest. . . [This] future interest would [likely] violate the 
Rule. Our task, then, is to determine if the Rule should be applied 
to this type of future interest.41   
Kansas case law had not considered whether to apply the Rule to a 
grantee’s future interest in a mineral estate when the grantor had reserved a 
defeasible term mineral interest.42.   
c) Conclusion 
The Court concluded that precedent supported an interpretation of the 
Rule that promoted the alienability, and therefore productive use, of real 
property.43 The common industry practice of retaining a defeasible term-
plus-production interest in minerals promoted the alienability and use of land 
and mineral estates. The Court went on to state that “[a]pplying the Rule here 
would be counterproductive to the purpose behind the Rule and create 
                                                                                                                 
 37. Id.   
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 1063.   
 42. Id. at 1064. 
 43. Id. at 1068. 
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chaos.”  Therefore, the Court held that where a conveyance creating a 
defeasible term-plus-production mineral interest by exception, where the 
future interest is held by an ascertainable grantee, the future mineral interest 
is not subject to the Rule.  The Court held that the Rule did not apply to 
Grantee’s interests, and therefore Jason Oil’s lease, affirming the district 
court’s granting of summary judgment. 44 
B. Appellate Activity 
No relevant appellate activity was reported during the survey period. 
C. Trial Activity 
No relevant trial activity was reported during the survey period. 
 
                                                                                                                 
 44. Id. 
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